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DEVELOPMENTS IN DISCLAIMERS
— by Neil E. Harl*
The long battle over disclaiming interests in jointly-
owned property moved a notch closer to conclusion with the
publication of new regulations in late December, 1997.1
The new regulations are effective for disclaimers on or after
December 31, 1997.2
Disclaiming jointly-held property
Initially, IRS resisted all disclaimers of jointly-owned
property interests, maintaining that such interests could be
disclaimed only within nine months after creation of the
interest.  After losing in litigation, IRS came to accept the
position that disclaimers of so-called “revocable” joint
interests (such as joint bank or brokerage accounts) could be
filed within nine months after death, not merely within nine
months after creation of the joint interest.3  Later, after
losing two Court of Appeals cases,4 IRS came to accept
joint tenancy disclaimers in land within nine months after
death and issued an Action on Decision to that effect.  IRS
continued, however, to resist disclaimers of interests held in
tenancy by the entirety5
However, in regulations issued in late December, 19976
effective for disclaimers on or after December 31, 1997, the
Department of the Treasury made several changes in its
position on disclaimers:
•  Under the new regulations, Treasury accepts
disclaimers of interests in tenancy by the entirety property
within nine months after death in the same manner as
disclaimers of interests in joint tenancy property.7  The
regulations specifically note that disclaimers can be made
regardless of whether the interest can be unilaterally
severed under local law (which is a feature of joint tenancy
ownership but not of tenancy by the entirety).8
•  For disclaimers on or after December 31, 1997, a
surviving joint tenant or tenant by the entirety cannot
disclaim any portion of a joint bank, brokerage or other
investment account attributable to consideration furnished
by the surviving joint tenant or tenant by the entirety.9  This
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means that 100 percent of a joint account funded by the first
joint owner to die can be disclaimed by the survivor.10  At
the same time, no part of a joint account can be disclaimed
if the survivor funded the account.11  A disclaimed interest
in a joint bank, brokerage or investment account (the
creation of which is an incomplete gift for federal gift tax
purposes)12 loses its character as joint property and passes
through the decedent’s gross estate with the interest
disclaimed subject to inclusion under I.R.C. § 2033 rather
than I.R.C. § 2040.13  The balance of the account not subject
to disclaimer retains its character as joint property, and is
includable in the gross estate under I.R.C. § 2040.14
For joint interests in real property (and presumably for
personal property other than bank accounts, brokerage
accounts and investment accounts), a gift is deemed to have
occurred on creation of the interest where contributions
were unequal and only half can be disclaimed.15
•  The nine month period for disclaiming the interest is
based upon the “transfer creating the interest,” rather than
upon a “taxable transfer.”16  This change clarifies that the
beginning point for the nine month disclaimer period is not
dependent upon the actual imposition of federal estate or
gift tax at the time the interest to be disclaimed is created.
Inducements to disclaim
A troublesome area in the past has been the effect of
cash gifts received by disclaimants at approximately the
time disclaimers were executed and whether such gifts
would disqualify the disclaimers.17  A Tax Court case,
Estate of Monroe,18 held that cash gifts would disqualify the
disclaimers.  However, that case was reversed and
remanded in 1997 to allow disclaimers where the payments
were not consideration for the disclaimers and, therefore,
those disclaimers were qualified.19  The Court of Appeals
remanded the case to determine whether some of the
disclaimers were mutually bargained for which would
disqualify the disclaimers.20
Quite clearly, any cash gift to a disclaimant raises a red
flag; linking the cash gift to the disclaimer such that the
disclaimer was considered to be mutually bargained for
goes over the line.
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1 See T.D. 8744, amending Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2518-1,
25.2518-2.  See generally 6 Harl, Agricultural Law §§
44.09, 46.08 (1997); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
5.02[6] (1997).
2 Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2518-2(c)(4)(iv), 25.2518-1(c)(3).
3 Dancy v. Comm’r, 872 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1989), rev’g, 89
T.C. 550 (1987) (disclaimers of “revocable” interests
were qualified; disclaimer of interest in tenancy by
entirety in real property not permitted).
4 Kennedy v. Comm’r, 804 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1986-3 (period for reasonable time to
disclaim surviving spouse’s interest in joint tenancy
interest held by decedent runs from date of death and not
creation of joint tenancy); McDonald v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1989-140, on rem. from, 853 F.2d 1494 (8th Cir.
1988), rev’g, 89 T.C. 293 (1987) (disclaimer timely
where surviving joint tenant made disclaimer within nine
months of joint tenant’s death but more than nine
months after creation of joint tenancy).
5 Ltr. Rul. 9208003, Oct. 28, 1991, rev’g  Ltr. Rul.
9106016, Nov. 8, 1990 (disclaimer of tenancy by
entirety interest by husband); Ltr. Rul. 9427003, March
30, 1994 (joint interest in tenancy by entirety real
property could not be disclaimed within nine months
after death). See also Hennessy v. U.S., 98-1 U.S. Tax
Cas (CCH) ¶ 60,298 (S.D. Ind. 1997) summarized in this
issue.
6 T.D. 8744, amending Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2518-1,
25.2518-2, and conforming Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-3,
20.2046-1, 20.2056(d)-2, 25.2511-1, 25.2514-3.
7 Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(4)(i).
8 Id.
9 Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2518-2(c)(4)(iii); 25.2518-2(c)(5), Ex.
13.
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17 See Estate of Monroe v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 352 (1995),
rev’d and remanded, 124 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1997).
18 104 T.C. 352 (1995).
19 Monroe v. Comm’r, 124 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1997).
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADEQUATE PROTECTION. Prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, the IRS filed a Notice of Levy against
the debtor’s funds in a bank account. After the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, the debtor sought recovery of the bank
account funds from the bank and the IRS also sought to
execute the levy. The debtor argued that the Notice of Levy
did not extinguish all of the debtor’s rights to the funds and,
upon the filing of the petition, the funds became bankruptcy
estate property subject to bankruptcy administration. The
court agreed, holding that the Notice of Levy made the IRS
only a secured party as to the funds. However, the IRS also
sought recovery of the funds as adequate protection for a
$84,000 secured tax claim. The debtor argued that the IRS
had to have first filed a motion for adequate protection. The
court disagreed, holding that the funds could be used for
adequate protection at any time that adequate protection was
shown to be needed. The IRS argued that the debtor had
been making payments to other secured creditors but had not
made any payments to the IRS. The court granted the funds
to the IRS as an adequate protection payment. Matter of
Creel, 214 B.R. 838 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997).
AUTOMATIC STAY. The IRS filed a claim for unpaid
income taxes, penalties and interest and unpaid employment
taxes, penalties and interest. Prior to the filing for
bankruptcy, the IRS had filed a notice of levy against the
debtors’ real property which was subject to an Illinois land
trust. The notice was not filed with the trustee. After the
bankruptcy filing, the IRS erroneously filed a duplicate
notice of levy and sent the debtors a notice of audit of
employment taxes for pre-bankruptcy tax years. The IRS
later rescinded the duplicate notice of levy. The debtors first
argued that the duplicate levy notice and audit notice
violated the automatic stay, but the court held that the
rescission of the duplicate notice removed any violation and
that an audit notice was not a violation of the automatic stay.
The debtors also argued that the rescission of the duplicate
notice caused the initial levy to be rescinded because the
second notice merged with the first. The court held that this
argument failed because the debtors failed to provide any
support for the merger theory in statute or case law. The
debtors also argued that the assessed penalties and interest
should have been abated because the debtors’ failure to pay
the taxes resulted from the high medical bills for their
disabled child. The court held that the debtors had sufficient
means to either pay the taxes from income or by borrowing
the money against their substantial equity in the debtors’
home. Carlson v. U.S., 126 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 1997), aff’g,
198 B.R. 949 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’g, 189 B.R. 454 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1996).
